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Abstract
Theoretical reference points have been proposed to differentiate probabilistic gains from
probabilistic losses in humans, but such a phenomenon in non-human animals has yet to
be thoroughly elucidated. Three experiments evaluated the effect of reward magnitude on
probabilistic choice in rats, seeking to determine reference point use by examining the effect
of previous outcome magnitude(s) on subsequent choice behavior. Rats were trained to
choose between an outcome that always delivered reward (low-uncertainty choice) and one
that probabilistically delivered reward (high-uncertainty). The probability of high-uncertainty
outcome receipt and the magnitudes of low-uncertainty and high-uncertainty outcomes
were manipulated within and between experiments. Both the low- and high-uncertainty
outcomes involved variable reward magnitudes, so that either a smaller or larger magnitude
was probabilistically delivered, as well as reward omission following high-uncertainty
choices. In Experiments 1 and 2, the between groups factor was the magnitude of the high-
uncertainty-smaller (H-S) and high-uncertainty-larger (H-L) outcome, respectively. The H-S
magnitude manipulation differentiated the groups, while the H-L magnitude manipulation
did not. Experiment 3 showed that manipulating the probability of differential losses as well
as the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice produced systematic effects on choice
behavior. The results suggest that the reference point for probabilistic gains and losses was
the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice. Current theories of probabilistic choice be-
havior have difficulty accounting for the present results, so an integrated theoretical frame-
work is proposed. Overall, the present results have implications for understanding
individual differences and corresponding underlying mechanisms of probabilistic
choice behavior.
Introduction
The analysis of risk-sensitive decision making has become a well-established area of research in
fields such as human judgment and decision making, animal choice behavior, and neuroeco-
nomics [1,2]. Probabilistic choice tasks typically involve choices between two options: a low-
uncertainty smaller magnitude outcome and a high-uncertainty larger magnitude outcome [3].
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Manipulations of the probability and magnitude of the high-uncertainty outcome have been
shown to considerably impact probabilistic choice behavior in humans [3–5]. Previous re-
search has shown that individual differences in probabilistic choice behavior are related to
gambling [6], cigarette smoking [7], and percent body fat [8]. These results are especially rele-
vant given the prevalence of risky behaviors such as pathological gambling [9,10] and drug use
and abuse [11]. Ultimately, these data reflect the necessity to determine the psychological and
neurobiological mechanisms of probabilistic decision making via the improved understanding
of adequate animal models of such behaviors [12–15].
One of the inherent properties of probabilistic decision making that has been overlooked in
the development of animal models is the presence of and sensitivity to differential gains and
losses. Gains and losses are judged relative to subjective reference points [16–19], in which pos-
itive and negative deviations from the reference point equate to subjective gains and losses, re-
spectively. One possible reference point is the individual’s current state, or what an individual
currently has [16]. This conceptualization is reasonable in regards to the human probabilistic
choice literature, as the monetary rewards that have been traditionally used as probabilistic
choice outcomes can be easily decreased or increased. However, given the use of consumable
rewards within the animal choice literature, the treatment of gains and losses relative to a cur-
rent state is challenging to operationalize, as an experimenter cannot readily take food away be-
cause it will have already been consumed in most cases. Accordingly, the criterion
distinguishing gains from losses in non-human animals has been proposed to take on other
values, such as the expected value of a choice [20]. However, despite previous research that has
identified both differential effects of gains and losses on probabilistic choice behavior in non-
human animals [21] and important roles for gains and losses (relative to a reference point) in
human decision making [16,22,23], explicit reference point use in rats remains open for inves-
tigation. Accordingly, the goal of the present study was to identify reference point use in rats,
an important pre-clinical model for understanding human risky decision making [15].
Indeed, the framing of outcomes as gains or losses considerably influences behavior in both
human and non-human animals [16,24–26]. The corresponding effects of differential gains
and losses may be elucidated via trial-by-trial analysis of choice behavior, as the outcomes of
previous choices have been shown to affect subsequent decision making behaviors in several
species [27–35]. One example of these local influences on choice behavior is a tendency to re-
peat the same behavior following a gain (i.e., win-stay), coupled with a reduced propensity to
repeat the same behavior following a loss (i.e., lose-shift) [21,28,31,33,36–40]. Here, lose-shift
behavior is operationally defined as a relatively decreased rate of repeating the same behavior,
as previous research has also demonstrated relatively more shifting (i.e., less staying) behavior
following losses relative to gains [21]; indeed, subjective biases may interfere with staying ver-
sus shifting behavior or a tendency to explore versus exploit various outcomes, such that ani-
mals may stay with the same choice after experienced losses. Interestingly, many risky-choice
situations, including casino games [41], do not adjust the probability of winning (or losing) as
a function of the most recent outcome, so a rational decision maker should not be differentially
affected by whether the previous outcome was a gain or a loss [42]. Nevertheless, the strong ef-
fect of the previous gains and losses suggests that human and non-human decision makers are
considerably influenced by such factors within probabilistic choice tasks, and that the corre-
sponding psychological processes warrant further investigation.
While the effects of previous outcomes on subsequent probabilistic choice have been fre-
quently investigated [21], the mechanisms by which animals track the outcomes as gains and
losses have not been conclusively determined. For example, if given the choice between an out-
come that always delivers one pellet (i.e., low-uncertainty) and an outcome of high-uncertainty
that probabilistically delivers zero or four pellets [21], the high-uncertainty four-pellet outcome
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may be considered as a gain relative to several possible reference points. Rats could potentially
use the high-uncertainty expected value, the zero-outcome on the high-uncertainty side, and/
or the low-uncertainty expected value as reference points.
If rats used a high-uncertainty reference point to gauge specific high-uncertainty magnitudes
as gains or losses, then the four-pellet high-uncertainty magnitude in the preceding example
would be judged as a gain because it is greater than the expected (mean) value of the high-un-
certainty outcome, and the zero-pellet magnitude would be judged as a loss because it is less
than the expected value of the high-uncertainty outcome. Note that the expected value of a
choice would presumably be learned through experience with choices and outcomes. In this ex-
ample, rats should show win-stay behavior follow the four-pellet outcome and lose-shift behav-
ior following the zero-pellet outcome. Previous theoretical approaches to probabilistic choice
behavior, such as prospect theory [16] and reinforcement learning [20], have posited the ex-
pected value of a choice as a potential reference point for determining the gain-loss value of
outcomes for that choice, consistent with the possibility that rats may use a high-uncertainty
reference point to guide subsequent high-uncertainty choices.
An alternative possible reference point is a zero-outcome reference point. In this case, all
non-zero magnitudes would be regarded as gains due to compensation of energy expended
while responding for that choice. The omission of food reward associated with the zero-pellet
outcome would be a net loss due to wasted energy expenditure. Optimal foraging theory has
proposed a gain-loss criterion similar to a zero-outcome reference point, in which the encoding
of gains and losses reflects the minimum daily energy intake required for survival [43]; the fail-
ure to approach this minimum value (i.e., receiving zero reward for a choice) would be consid-
ered as a loss. Here, a loss (or gain) represents an outcome that is less than (or greater than) the
current status quo. Thus, if a zero-pellet outcome is the subjective reference point, then the rats
should exhibit win-stay behavior following all non-zero food amounts and lose-shift behavior
following the zero-pellet outcome.
A third potential reference point is a low-uncertainty reference point. In this case, high-un-
certainty gains and losses may be regarded relative to the alternative low-uncertainty choice.
While this specific idea for a reference point has, to our knowledge, not been previously consid-
ered in the encoding of gains and losses in probabilistic choice in non-human animals, it has
received some attention in the human literature [44,45], in examining the subjective regret pro-
duced when an uncertain outcome yields a poorer result than what could have been achieved
through a different alternative. Interestingly, recent research has suggested that rats may expe-
rience regret. Specifically, Steiner and Redish [46] showed that when foregone low-cost out-
comes are immediately followed by a possible high-cost outcome, rats show behavioral and
neurobiological activity that is potentially consistent with the experience of regret [47]. While
such results may reflect outcome valuation relative to an alternative outcome (i.e., low-uncer-
tainty reference point), the task involved costs that were determined by expected delays until
reward as opposed to the experienced probabilistic outcome magnitudes. Furthermore, the re-
sults seemingly identified that rats could experience regret, rather than explicitly identifying
that such regret underlies the subjective criterion categorizing gains and losses (i.e., in terms of
an alternative-outcome reference point). Therefore, it is critical to evaluate choice behavior
within probabilistic decision making tasks in which outcome magnitude may be inherently dy-
namic given the task employed. If high-uncertainty gains and losses are compared to a low-un-
certainty reference point, then rats should exhibit win-stay and lose-shift behavior,
respectively, following high-uncertainty food rewards greater than and less than the expected
value of the low-uncertainty choice.
Given that a food outcome may be regarded as a gain or loss relative to high-uncertainty,
zero-outcome, or low-uncertainty reference points, it is important to design experiments to
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differentiate between these possibilities. Accordingly, the goal of the present set of experiments
was to determine the reference points that distinguish gains from losses in rats by analyzing the
effects of low-uncertainty and high-uncertainty choice outcome magnitudes on global and
local probabilistic choice behavior. The primary criterion for reference-point identification
(and thus the identification of gains and losses) was the presence of considerable differences in
choice behavior following differential outcomes [19]. The current paradigm was similar to that
used by Marshall and Kirkpatrick [33], in which both low-uncertainty choices and rewarded
high-uncertainty choices involved variable-magnitude outcomes. The use of variable outcomes,
in conjunction with probabilistic food omissions following high-uncertainty choices, permitted
differentiation between different reference points and a greater understanding of the mecha-
nisms governing choice behavior following experienced gains and losses. Experiments 1 and 2
investigated the effect of individual probabilistic outcome magnitudes on global and local
choice behavior to determine which outcomes were gauged as probabilistic gains and/or losses.
Subsequently, Experiment 3 determined the effect of manipulations of differential probabilistic
losses on choice behavior, in addition to evaluating the role of the low-uncertainty outcome
choice in its effect on probabilistic choice.
Experiment 1
Method
Animals. Twenty-four experimentally-naive male Sprague-Dawley rats (Charles River, Por-
tage, MI) were used in the experiment. They arrived at the facility (Kansas State University,
Manhattan, KS) at approximately 45 days of age. The rats were pair-housed in a red-illuminat-
ed colony room that was set to a reverse 12:12 hr light:dark schedule (lights off at approximate-
ly 6 am). The rats were tested during the dark phase. There was ad libitum access to water in
the home cages and in the experimental chambers. The rats were maintained at approximately
85% of their projected ad libitum weight during the experiment, based on growth-curve charts
obtained from the supplier. When supplementary feeding was required following an experi-
mental session, the rats were fed in their home cages approximately 1 hr after being returned to
the colony room [48,49].
Ethics statement. All research was conducted in accordance with the Guide for the Care
and Use of Laboratory Animals of the National Research Council, and with the approval of the
Kansas State University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Protocol 3102).
Apparatus. The experiment was conducted in 24 operant chambers (Med-Associates,
St. Albans, VT) each housed within sound-attenuating, ventilated boxes (74 × 38 × 60 cm).
Each operant chamber (25 × 30 × 30 cm) was equipped with a stainless steel grid floor; two
stainless steel walls (front and back); and a transparent polycarbonate side wall, ceiling, and
door. Two pellet dispensers (ENV-203), mounted on the outside of the operant chamber, deliv-
ered 45-mg food pellets (Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ) to a food cup (ENV-200R7) that was cen-
tered on the lower section of the front wall. Head entries into the food magazine were
transduced by an infrared photobeam (ENV-254). Two retractable levers (ENV-112CM) were
located on opposite sides of the food cup. Water was always available from a sipper tube that
protruded through the back wall of the chamber. Experimental events were controlled and re-
corded with 2-ms resolution by the software programMED-PC IV [50].
Procedure
Magazine and lever press training. The rats were given a random-time 60-s schedule of food
deliveries for magazine training, earning approximately 120 pellets in a single 2-hr session. The
rats were then given two sessions of lever-press training with a fixed ratio (FR) 1 schedule of
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reinforcement that was followed by a random ratio (RR) 3 schedule and then an RR 5; each of
these schedules lasted until the rats earned 20 pellets on each lever.
Probabilistic choice task. Each pair of rats was randomly assigned to one of three groups
(n = 8). Following a rewarded high-uncertainty choice, Group 1–11 received 1 or 11 pellets,
Group 2–11, 2 or 11 pellets, and Group 4–11, 4 or 11 pellets (p = .50). The smaller and larger
high-uncertainty choices were labeled the high-small (H-S) and high-large (H-L) outcomes,
respectively. An unrewarded high-uncertainty choice resulted in no food being delivered
(high-zero, H-Z). The alternative low-uncertainty choice resulted in either 2 or 4 pellets (p = .50;
low-small, L-S, and low-large, L-L, respectively).
Each session consisted of 8 forced choice trials followed by a series of free choice trials. On
forced choice trials, one lever was inserted into the chamber. Each lever corresponded to one of
two choices; lever assignments were counterbalanced within each pair of rats. When the lever
was pressed, a fixed interval 20-s schedule began; the first lever press after 20 s resulted in lever
retraction and food delivery. If the lever corresponded to the low-uncertainty outcome, then ei-
ther the L-S or L-L outcome was delivered (p = .50). If the forced choice lever corresponded to
the high-uncertainty outcome, then either the H-S or H-L outcome was delivered (p = .50). In
forced choice trials, food was always delivered following high-uncertainty forced choices. Each
non-zero food amount for the low-uncertainty and high-uncertainty choices was presented
twice in the forced choice trials in a random order. Free choice trials were identical to forced
choice trials except that two levers were inserted into the chamber, a choice on one of the levers
caused the other lever to retract, and food omission was possible following high-uncertainty
choices (i.e., H-Z). A 10-s inter-trial interval (ITI) intervened between successive trials.
In different phases, the programmed probability of food delivery following a high-uncer-
tainty choice was .10, .25, .33, .50, .67, .75, or .90 (see Table 1 for high-uncertainty choice ex-
pected values for each group). Food deliveries on individual trials were determined using a
probability with replacement algorithm so that individual trial outcomes were orthogonal to
each other. All rats were first exposed to high-uncertainty food deliveries with a probability of
.50. Phase 2 involved a reversal of the lever assignments to reduce any lever biases. For Phases
3–8, the rats in each group were partitioned into two subgroups (based on their high-uncer-
tainty choice behavior in Phase 2) that experienced the probabilities of high-uncertainty food
delivery in different orders: .75, .33, .67, .25, .90, and .10; or .25, .67, .33, .75, .10, and .90. In
Phase 9, all of the rats were returned to the probability of .50.
Phases 1 and 2 lasted for 20 sessions each. Phase 3 lasted for 22 sessions. After the first 12
sessions of Phase 3, the maximum number of free choice trials was reduced from 160 to 100 to
Table 1. Expected value of the high-uncertainty choice as a function of the probability of food for a
high-uncertainty choice for each group in Experiment 1.
Probability Group 1–11 Group 2–11 Group 4–11
.10 0.60 0.65 0.75
.25 1.50 1.63 1.88
.33 2.00 2.17 2.50
.50 3.00 3.25 3.75
.67 4.00 4.33 5.00
.75 4.50 4.88 5.63
.90 5.40 5.85 6.75
Group 1–11 received 1 or 11 pellets following a high-uncertainty choice, Group 2–11, 2 or 11 pellets, and
Group 4–11, 4 or 11 pellets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.t001
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better maintain the rats’ weights at approximately 85% of their ad libitum weights; this change
was maintained for the rest of the experiment. Phase 4 lasted for 11 sessions. Phases 5–9 lasted
for 10 sessions each. Each session terminated after all free choice trials were completed or after
2 hr.
Data analysis. The final five sessions of Phases 3–9 were used for data analyses, with the ex-
ception of one rat that did not complete Phase 9; for this rat, the first 100 choice trials of each
of the final five sessions in Phase 2 were used. The rats’molar choice behavior was stable across
the final five sessions of each phase. Across Phases 2–9, the mean absolute deviation in choice
percentages between each of the final five sessions and the mean of the final five sessions of
each phase was 4.5%. Statistical analyses were collapsed across the different orders of exposure
to the probabilities of uncertain food delivery. Specifically, an ANOVA with factors of group
(1–11, 2–11, 4–11) and order of probability exposure was conducted on choice data from
Phase 2 and Phase 9 (i.e., when the probability of high-uncertainty food equaled .50). There
were no significant Group × Order or Phase × Group × Order interactions, suggesting that the
order of probabilities did not interact with any effect of group (i.e., an effect of H-S reward
magnitude), the primary effect of interest. Lastly, only significant test statistics are reported,
p< .05. Unless described otherwise, post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction (with original
alpha value of .05 prior to correction) were employed for the analyses of significant effects.
Molar analyses of choice behavior involved analyzing the log odds of high-uncertainty
choices. The log odds of a choice is a more sensitive measure to detect differences in choice be-
havior, reduces ceiling and floor effects, and more readily meets the data scaling assumptions
of the general linear model employed for analysis of variance (ANOVA). The empirical log
odds formulation was of the following form:
LogOdds ¼ log NH þ 0:5
NL þ 0:5
in which NH was the number of high-uncertainty choices and NL was the number of low-un-
certainty choices [51,52]. A value of 0.5 was added to the numerator and denominator to cor-
rect for exclusive choice behavior [53]. Here, values greater than zero reﬂect more choices for
the option in the numerator (i.e., high-uncertainty choices), while values less than zero reﬂect
more choices for the option in the denominator (i.e., low-uncertainty choices).
Molecular analyses involved measuring the log odds of high-uncertainty choices as a func-
tion of the previous outcome. These data were collapsed across the probability of high-uncer-
tainty choice food delivery. As described previously [33], when the number of high-uncertainty
choices was small (i.e., at low probabilities of high-uncertainty food), there was the possibility
that an animal never received one of the high-uncertainty magnitudes due to the reduction in
the number of corresponding choices. Thus, there would be no data as a function of a previous
high-uncertainty outcome because that outcome was never delivered. Accordingly, these data
were collapsed across probabilities due to such missing data within some probability-outcome
combinations; for analyses of previous outcome by probability interactions on choice, see [33].
For both molar and molecular analyses, the internal reliability of individual differences was
measured using Cronbach’s alpha (α). This provides an assessment of consistency in choice be-
havior of individuals across testing with different probabilities of high-uncertainty food.
Results
Molar analysis. Fig. 1A shows the log odds of high-uncertainty choices as a function of the
probability of high-uncertainty choice food delivery. All groups exhibited a general increase in
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high-uncertainty choices as the probability of food increased. Furthermore, Group 4–11 made
the most high-uncertainty choices, followed by Group 2–11 and then Group 1–11.
Choice behavior was stable across probabilities of food, α = .92. An ANOVA with probabili-
ty as the within groups factor and group (1–11, 2–11, and 4–11) as the between groups factor
revealed main effects of probability, F(6, 126) = 10.73, p< .001, ηp
2 = .338, and group,
F(2, 21) = 7.64, p = .003, ηp
2 = .421. Post-hoc analyses revealed that Group 1–11 chose the
high-uncertainty outcome significantly less than Group 4–11. To determine whether the effect
of the H-S reward magnitude on choice behavior was due to the different expected values at
each probability of high-uncertainty food delivery, the choice results are plotted as a function
of the high-uncertainty expected value in Fig. 1B (see Table 1 for expected values). At similar
expected values of the high-uncertainty choice, Group 1–11 still made high-uncertainty choices
less often than Group 2–11, which chose the high-uncertainty outcome less than Group 4–11.
In addition, Groups 1–11 and 2–11 were overly risk averse. The predicted indifference point
for choices (where the log odds would equal 0) should be at an expected value of 3, which is
equal to the low-uncertainty choice expected value. Group 4–11 displayed indifference near
this expected value and preferred the high-uncertainty choice for higher expected values, but
the other two groups remained biased towards the low-uncertainty choice.
Molecular analysis. Fig. 2 shows the log odds of high-uncertainty choices as a function of
the previous outcome. Following L-S and L-L outcomes, the rats were more likely to stay on
Fig 1. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices for each group in Experiment 1 as a function
of the probability of high-uncertainty food delivery (A) and the expected value of the high-uncertainty
outcome (B). The horizontal line indicates neutral preference of the two outcomes. Values below this line
reflect risk aversion (more low-uncertainty than high-uncertainty choices), and values above it reflect risk
proneness (more high-uncertainty than low-uncertainty choices). A second ordinate showing the
percentages corresponding to the log odds values was included to aid interpretation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g001
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the low-uncertainty side than they were to switch to the high-uncertainty side. Following H-Z,
H-S, and H-L outcomes, the rats were more likely to make another high-uncertainty choice. In-
dividual differences in molecular choice behavior were stable as a function of the previous out-
come, α = .85. An ANOVA with previous outcome as the within groups factor and group as
the between groups factor revealed main effects of previous outcome, F(4, 84) = 225.55, p< .001,
ηP
2 = .915, and group, F(2, 21) = 9.73, p = .001, ηP
2 = .481. Post-hoc analyses revealed that
Group 1–11 chose the high-uncertainty outcome significantly less often than Groups 2–11 and
4–11. Furthermore, high-uncertainty choice behavior following L-S and L-L outcomes was sig-
nificantly less than following H-Z, H-S, and H-L outcomes and uncertain choice behavior fol-
lowing H-Z outcomes was significantly less than following H-S and H-L outcomes. Choice
behavior following L-S versus L-L outcomes or following H-S versus H-L outcomes did not
significantly differ.
In conjunction with our hypotheses and specific goals concerning the distinction of gains
from losses, additional post-hoc analyses were performed to target possible group differences
in choice behavior following H-S and H-L outcomes. Significant differences in subsequent
choice behavior following H-S and H-L outcomes may suggest that these outcomes were re-
garded as losses and gains, respectively, and that the group differences were due to exposure to
differential gains and losses. An ANOVA with previous outcome (H-S, H-L) as the within
groups factor and group as the between groups factor revealed a significant increase in the
log odds of high-uncertainty choices following H-L relative to H-S outcomes, F(1, 21) = 8.03,
p = .010, ηP
2 = .277, a main effect of group, F(2, 21) = 4.23, p = .029, ηP
2 = .287, and a Previous
Outcome × Group interaction, F(2, 21) = 5.52, p = .012, ηP
2 = .344. Paired sample t-tests con-
ducted on the interaction revealed that Groups 1–11 and 2–11 were significantly less likely to
make a high-uncertainty choice following H-S outcomes than following H-L outcomes.
The group differences as revealed by the preceding analysis suggest that the H-S outcome
may have been encoded differently (i.e., gain or loss) depending on its magnitude. However, as
Fig 2. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices for each group in Experiment 1 as a function
of the outcome of the previous choice, collapsed across the probability of high-uncertainty food
delivery. A second ordinate showing percentages corresponding to the log odds values was included to aid
interpretation. L-S = low-uncertainty-small; L-L = low-uncertainty-large; H-Z = high-uncertainty-zero; H-S =
high-uncertainty-small; H-L = high-uncertainty-large.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g002
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the magnitude of the H-S reward co-varied with the expected value of the high-uncertainty
choice, it is difficult to disentangle the source of the effects. Specifically, the significant differ-
ences (or lack thereof) between H-S and H-L outcomes may reflect whether the corresponding
reward magnitudes were less than or greater than the expected value of the high-uncertainty
choice, respectively. If so, then the rats should show differential post H-L and post H-S choice
behavior depending on how the magnitudes of these outcomes compared to the expected value
of the high-uncertainty choice. Accordingly, a more sensitive analysis was warranted to better
unravel the local versus global effects of reward magnitude on choice behavior. Fig. 3 shows the
difference score between post H-L and post H-S choice behavior as a function of the relation-
ship between the H-S reward magnitude and the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice;
these difference scores were calculated by subtracting the log odds of high-uncertainty choices
following H-S outcomes from the log odds following H-L outcomes for each probability. Posi-
tive scores indicate greater win-stay following H-L outcomes than following H-S outcomes,
indicating sensitivity to high-uncertainty outcome magnitude. If the reference point for high-
uncertainty gains and losses is the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice, then the dif-
ference score should approximate zero when both H-S and H-L outcomes are gains (right side
of the vertical dashed line) and should be considerably greater than zero when only the H-L
outcome is a gain (i.e., less high-uncertainty choice behavior following a H-S loss; left side of
vertical dashed line). As seen in Fig. 3, there were no apparent effects of H-S reward magnitude
as a gain or a loss relative to the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice on subsequent
choice behavior. A linear regression analysis determined whether the slopes for any of the
groups were different than zero, as would be produced by a high-uncertainty reference point.
Of the 168 data points involved in this analysis (24 subjects × 7 expected values of high-
Fig 3. Mean (±SEM) difference score between the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following high-
uncertainty-large (H-L) outcomes and the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following high-
uncertainty-small (H-S) outcomes for each group in Experiment 1 as a function of the difference
between the magnitude of the H-S outcome and the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice. A
negative/positive difference on the abscissa indicates that the H-S outcomemagnitude was greater than/less
than the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice (gain/loss, respectively). A negative or positive
difference on the ordinate reflects a greater likelihood to make high-uncertainty choices following H-S or H-L
outcomes, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g003
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uncertainty food), there were 31 missing data points; twenty of these 31 missing data points
were due to the absence of data following either H-S or H-L outcomes at probabilities of high-
uncertainty food .10 and .25, in which the number of total high-uncertainty choices (and there-
by the total number of H-S and H-L outcomes) was relatively small and thus some rats did not
have the opportunity to make choices following these outcomes. All but two rats (both in
Group 1–11) had at least 5 data points included in the analysis. As the exclusion of these rats
did not change the interpretation of the analysis, such that the statistical significance of the re-
sults was not considerably affected, these animals were not excluded from analysis. Ultimately,
the analysis revealed that the slopes were not significantly different from zero.
Discussion
The goal of the present experiment was to determine the effect of H-S outcome magnitude on
global and local probabilistic choice behavior. In conjunction with previous research
[21,33,39,40,54–56], an increase in the probability of receiving the probabilistic (i.e., high-un-
certainty) outcome produced an increase in probabilistic choice behavior (Fig. 1A). Further-
more, increases in the magnitude of the H-S outcome increased high-uncertainty choices, and
this result was not explicable by differences in the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice
(Fig. 1B). According to normative/rational theories of choice behavior, the rats in Group 1–11
were behaving irrationally, avoiding the high-uncertainty choice despite the potential to earn
considerably more food at higher probabilities, consistent with previous research demonstrat-
ing that human and non-human animals do not make choices in accordance with normative
theories [57,58]. Furthermore, these results cannot be explained in terms of differences in sati-
ety due to differences in reward magnitude; specifically, in accordance with the energy-budget
literature suggesting that satiety should ultimately reduce risk-taking [59,60], an effect of sati-
ety would have been evident had the rats receiving the most reward (Group 4–11) been more
risk averse. As shown in Figs. 1 and 2, this was not exhibited. Thus, the group differences in
choice behavior were influenced by a rather strong effect of the magnitude of the H-S reward,
with the groups that received a greater H-S reward magnitude ultimately making more high-
uncertainty choices. Therefore, while the rats demonstrated some sensitivity to expected value
by showing a general increase in high-uncertainty choice behavior with increases in the proba-
bility of high-uncertainty food, the corresponding behavior critically depended on the individ-
ual outcomes of high-uncertainty choices.
The reward magnitude of the H-S outcome also had an effect on local choice behavior. As
seen in Fig. 2, increases in H-S outcome magnitude increased high-uncertainty choice behavior
following the H-S outcome. Importantly, the more targeted analyses of choice behavior follow-
ing H-S and H-L outcomes revealed significant differences in high-uncertainty choice behavior
in Groups 1–11 and 2–11, but not in Group 4–11. These results suggest that the 1- and 2-pellet
outcomes were regarded as losses while the 4- and 11-pellet outcomes were regarded as gains.
As described above, high-uncertainty gains and losses may be distinguished by whether they
are greater than or equal to either zero, the expected value of the high-uncertainty outcome, or
the alternative low-uncertainty outcome. Traditionally, win-stay/lose-shift behavior has been
explained in terms of a high-uncertainty reference point. However, this explanation was not
supported by the difference score analysis between post H-S and post H-L choice behavior as a
function of high-uncertainty reward probability (see Fig. 3).
A zero-outcome reference point is consistent with the overall win-stay/lose-shift behavior seen
in the local choice analysis. However, a zero-outcome reference point cannot account for the large
group differences in global choice behavior (Figs. 1 and 2), as each group would have been ex-
posed to relatively comparable gains and losses. Therefore, the significant effect of H-S outcome
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magnitude on global choice behavior (Fig. 1) argues against a zero-outcome reference point.
However, the use of a zero-outcome reference point is tested more explicitly in Experiment 3.
Accordingly, the interesting proposition raised by the present results is that, although re-
ward omission has been shown to be a critical determinant of subsequent behavior [33,61,62],
high-uncertainty gains and losses were distinguished relative to a low-uncertainty-outcome ref-
erence point. Specifically, as the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice was constant at a
value of 3, the high-uncertainty magnitudes were consistently either greater than or less than
the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice. Indeed, such constancy accounts for the cor-
responding patterns of behavior in Fig. 3. Furthermore, assuming a low-uncertainty reference
point, the reduction in probabilistic choice behavior in Groups 1–11 and 2–11 suggests that
these groups may have experienced more probabilistic losses (0 and 1, 0 and 2) than Group
4–11 (0) did. However, while a zero-outcome reference point could not account for the results
alone, reward omission may have produced an additional effect on behavior above and beyond
the low-uncertainty reference point, at least at the level of win-stay/lose-shift behavior.
The present results also suggest that rats may be more sensitive to a relative loss than to a
relative gain [16,18,63]. In all groups, the absolute difference between the magnitudes of the
H-Z and H-S outcomes was smaller than that of the H-S and H-L outcomes; however, while
Groups 1–11 and 2–11 showed significantly different choice behavior following H-Z, H-S, and
H-L outcomes (i.e., two losses and one gain), Group 4–11 showed relatively similar choice be-
havior following H-S and H-L outcomes (i.e., two gains). This latter finding suggests that as
long as the outcome of a successful “gamble” is greater than the low-uncertainty reference
point, then outcome magnitude may have a relatively small effect on subsequent high-uncer-
tainty choice behavior, compared to if the outcome of a gamble is smaller than the low-uncer-
tainty reference point. Such differential sensitivity to the magnitude of the high-uncertainty
outcomes, dependent on how such outcomes compare to the value of the low-uncertainty
choice, may then reflect a differential sensitivity to relative gains versus relative losses
[16,18,63]. One direct test of this hypothesis would be to vary H-L magnitude while maintain-
ing its status as a gain relative to a low-uncertainty reference point, which would produce little
or no effect on high-uncertainty choice behavior. Specifically, while it is hypothesized that
gains and losses are not simply categorical dichotomies, it is also hypothesized that they are dif-
ferentially scaled. That is, a diminished sensitivity to increasing gains is expected to produce
relatively similar choice behavior. Accordingly, this question was the focus of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Method
Animals. Twenty-four experimentally-naïve rats, approximately 45 days of age on arrival,
served as subjects. The housing and husbandry conditions were identical to Experiment 1, with
the exception that the colony room lights turned off at 8 am.
Apparatus. The experimental apparatus was identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
Magazine and lever-press training. The magazine and lever-press training procedures were
identical to Experiment 1, except that one rat required a third session of lever-press training.
Probabilistic choice task. Training was identical to Experiment 1 with some exceptions.
The H-L reward magnitude was 6, 9, or 11 pellets in Groups 4–6, 4–9, and 4–11, respectively,
while the H-S magnitude was 4 pellets in all groups. The two orders of high-uncertainty food
probabilities for Phases 3–6 were .90, .33, .67, .10; and, .10, .67, .33, .90, following initial base-
line training at the .50 probability (see Table 2 for expected values). In Phase 7, all rats were
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returned to the probability of .50. Phases 1 and 2 lasted for 20 sessions each, and Phases 3–7
lasted for 10 sessions each. Sessions terminated following the completion of 100 free choice tri-
als or after 2 hr.
Data analysis. Data analysis was the same as in Experiment 1. Specifically, an ANOVAwith
factors of group (4–6, 4–9, 4–11) and order of probability exposure was conducted on choice data
from Phase 2 and Phase 7 (i.e., when the probability of high-uncertainty food equaled .50). Analysis
did not reveal Group × Order or Phase × Group × Order interactions, suggesting that the order of
probabilities did not interact with any effect of group (i.e., an effect of H-L reward magnitude), the
primary effect of interest. Further, the rats’molar choice behavior was stable across the final five
sessions of each phase. Across Phases 3–7, the mean absolute deviation in choice percentages be-
tween each of the final five sessions and the mean of the final five sessions of each phase was 5.9%.
Results
Molar analysis. Fig. 4A shows the log odds of high-uncertainty choices as a function of the
probability of high-uncertainty food delivery (Cronbach’s α = .57). All groups showed an in-
crease in high-uncertainty choices as a function of the probability of high-uncertainty reward,
but there were no systematic group differences. An ANOVA with probability as the within
groups factor and group as the between groups factor revealed a main effect of probability,
F(4, 84) = 22.64, p< .001, ηp
2 = .519. Fig. 4B shows the log odds of high-uncertainty choices as
a function of the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice. While each group showed an
increase in high-uncertainty choice behavior with increases in the expected value of the high-
uncertainty choice, expected value did not appear to govern molar choice behavior. Instead,
the functions superposed better when plotted against probability of high-uncertainty food.
Molecular analysis. Fig. 5 shows the effects of the previous outcome on subsequent choice
behavior (Cronbach’s α = .51). The groups were more likely to make low-uncertainty choices
following low-uncertainty outcomes, and high-uncertainty choices following high-uncertainty
outcomes. Additionally, all groups showed an increased tendency to make high-uncertainty
choices following H-S and H-L outcomes than following H-Z outcomes. An ANOVA with pre-
vious outcome as the within groups factor and group as the between groups factor revealed a
main effect of previous outcome, F(4, 84) = 295.69, p< .001, ηP
2 = .934, and a Previous Out-
come × Group interaction, F(8, 84) = 2.16, p = .039, ηP
2 = .171. To explore the Previous Out-
come × Group interaction, simple effects analyses using a one-way ANOVA with group as the
between groups factor were conducted on the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following
each outcome to evaluate the effect of group on choice behavior following each individual out-
come. These analyses did not reveal a main effect of group following any of the previous
Table 2. Expected value of the high-uncertainty choice as a function of the probability of food for a
high-uncertainty choice for each group in Experiment 2.
Probability Group 4–6 Group 4–9 Group 4–11
.10 0.50 0.65 0.75
.33 1.65 2.17 2.50
.50 2.50 3.25 3.75
.67 3.35 4.33 5.00
.90 4.50 5.85 6.75
Group 4–6 received 4 or 6 pellets following a high-uncertainty choice, Group 4–9, 4 or 9 pellets, and Group
4–11, 4 or 11 pellets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.t002
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outcomes. The interaction was most likely due to the lesser degree of win-stay/lose-shift behav-
ior in Group 4–9, but this was not localizable to any of the individual comparisons.
To address the hypothesis that rats exhibit differential sensitivities to high-uncertainty gains
and losses relative to a low-uncertainty reference point, additional analyses were performed to
determine if there were differences in choice behavior following H-S and H-L outcomes, as in
Experiment 1. An ANOVA with previous outcome (H-S, H-L) as the within groups factor and
group as the between groups factor did not reveal any significant effects.
To further test the effect of H-S and H-L outcomes on subsequent choice behavior, in rela-
tion to a high-uncertainty reference point, Fig. 6 shows the difference between choice behavior
following H-L and H-S outcomes as a function of the difference between the expected value of
the high-uncertainty choice and the magnitude of the H-S outcome. Positive difference scores
reflect greater high-uncertainty choices following the larger magnitude (H-L) outcome than
following the H-S outcome. The tendency for the functions in Fig. 6 to approximate a zero
slope suggests that there was little, if any, difference in choice behavior following the high-un-
certainty food outcomes across conditions in which the H-S outcome was greater or less than
the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice. The data were subjected to a linear regres-
sion analysis to determine whether the functional slopes for any of the groups were different
than zero, as would be expected assuming a high-uncertainty reference point. Of the 120 data
points involved in this analysis (24 subjects × 5 expected values of high-uncertainty food),
there were 16 missing data points; thirteen of these 16 missing data points were due to the ab-
sence of data following either H-S or H-L outcomes at probabilities of high-uncertainty food .1,
Fig 4. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices for each group in Experiment 2 as a function
of the probability of high-uncertainty food delivery (A) and the expected value of a high-uncertainty
outcome (B). A second ordinate showing percentages corresponding to the log odds values is included to
aid interpretation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g004
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Fig 5. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices for each group in Experiment 2 as a function
of the outcome of the previous choice, collapsed across the probability of high-uncertainty food
delivery. A second ordinate showing percentages corresponding to the log odds values was included to aid
interpretation. L-S = low-uncertainty-small; L-L = low-uncertainty-large; H-Z = high-uncertainty-zero; H-S =
high-uncertainty-small; H-L = high-uncertainty-large.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g005
Fig 6. Mean (±SEM) difference score between the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following high-
uncertainty-large (H-L) outcomes and the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following high-
uncertainty-small (H-S) outcomes for each group in Experiment 2 as a function of the difference
between the magnitude of the H-S outcome and the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice. A
negative/positive difference on the abscissa indicates that the H-S outcomemagnitude was greater than/less
than the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice (gain/loss, respectively). A negative or positive
difference on the ordinate reflects a greater likelihood to make high-uncertainty choices following H-S or H-L
outcomes, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g006
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in which the number of total high-uncertainty choices (and thereby the total number of H-S
and H-L outcomes) was relatively small. All but two rats had at least 4 data points included in
the analysis. As the exclusion of these rats did not change the interpretation of the analysis,
such that the statistical significance of the results was not considerably affected, these animals
were not excluded from analysis. Ultimately, the analysis revealed that the slopes were not sig-
nificantly different from zero.
Discussion
The goal of the present experiment was to determine the effect of H-L outcome magnitude on
global and local probabilistic choice behavior. Similar to Experiment 1, the increase in the
probability of high-uncertainty food delivery produced a general increase in high-uncertainty
choices (Fig. 4A). However, in contrast to the effects of different H-S reward magnitudes on
choice behavior (Experiment 1), the changes in H-L magnitude did not affect probabilistic
choice behavior. This pattern was not altered when the choice functions were plotted relative
to the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice (Fig. 4B).
The present results, in conjunction with those of Experiment 1, cannot be explained as
being due to differences in the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice. The parameters
used in the current experiment were designed to produce expected values that matched or
closely approximated those in Experiment 1. Groups 4–11 were identical in the two experi-
ments, Group 2–11 matched the expected values of Group 4–9, and Group 1–11 closely ap-
proximated the expected values of Group 4–6 (see Tables 1 and 2). Despite the similar
expected values, the effects of the magnitude manipulations in the two experiments were decid-
edly different, lending further support to the notion that the rats used a low-uncertainty refer-
ence point to gauge high-uncertainty gains and losses and that the rats were more sensitive to
losses relative to that reference point. There are two possible explanations of the results: (1)
rats may be unable to discriminate larger outcome magnitudes as readily as smaller outcome
magnitudes, consistent with Weber’s law; and (2) the rats may experience diminishing margin-
al utility of increasing gains, ultimately resulting in reduced sensitivities to larger gains. The
present results cannot differentiate these two possibilities, and they may indeed be related. In
either event, the findings suggest that further consideration of non-linear scaling of magnitudes
be undertaken (see General Discussion).
The different H-L reward magnitudes also did not affect local choice behavior. The H-Z out-
comes appeared to be encoded as losses, given the reduction in subsequent high-uncertainty
choice behavior following H-Z outcomes, whereas the high-uncertainty food outcomes ap-
peared to be encoded as gains of similar value. Therefore, high-uncertainty gains and losses do
not seem to have been gauged relative to the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice.
However, the present data do not conclusively eliminate a role for a zero-outcome reference
point, as the reduced sensitivity to gains could be explained by the non-zero high-uncertainty
food outcomes being greater than both the low-uncertainty reference point and a zero-out-
come reference point. Accordingly, a more thorough elucidation of low-uncertainty versus
zero-outcome reference point use will be examined in Experiment 3.
The current hypothesis that high-uncertainty food rewards serve as losses and gains relative
to a low-uncertainty reference point is critical as it is inconsistent with many theories of deci-
sion making (see the General Discussion for further details). However, it is possible that the
one-pellet outcome in Experiment 1 was regarded as a loss because it was subjectively closer to
the zero-pellet outcome than it was to the 11-pellet outcome (gain). To assess sensitivity to the
0- and 1-pellet outcomes, Experiment 3 delivered within groups manipulations of probability
of receipt of each of these outcomes. If rats are more sensitive to 0-pellet outcomes, then
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changing the probability of the 0-pellet outcome should produce a greater change in high-un-
certainty choices than changing the probability of the 1-pellet outcome. In addition, the rats re-
ceived within groups manipulations of low-uncertainty outcome magnitude across phases to
provide further indication of loss assessment of the 0- and 1-pellet outcomes.
Lastly, it is also possible that the individual values of the low-uncertainty choice comprised
the reference point instead of the corresponding expected value. Specifically, the 1-pellet uncer-
tain outcome in Group 1–11 (Experiment 1) may have been regarded as a loss because it was
less than both the 2- and 4-pellet low-uncertainty outcomes, and the 2-pellet high-uncertainty
outcome for Group 2–11 may have been regarded as a loss (but less of a loss) because it was
less than only the 4-pellet low-uncertainty outcome. This question was addressed in Experi-
ment 3 by maintaining a constant expected value of the low-uncertainty choice and employing
a between groups manipulation of the individual low-uncertainty outcome values.
Experiment 3
Method
Animals. Twenty-four experimentally-naïve rats, approximately 45 days of age on arrival,
served as subjects. The housing and husbandry conditions were identical to Experiment 2.
Apparatus. The experimental apparatus was identical to Experiments 1 and 2.
Procedure
Magazine and lever-press training. The magazine and lever-press training procedures were
identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Magazine training lasted for one session and lever-press
training lasted for three sessions.
Experiment 3A: High-uncertainty probability training. The high-uncertainty probability
training procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 with some exceptions. The rats were
randomly partitioned into Group 2–4 and Group 1–5, in which the group names refer to the
L-S and L-L outcomes. The probability of each low-uncertainty outcome was .50 to equate
overall expected value in the two groups at 3 pellets. For both groups, a high-uncertainty choice
resulted in the probabilistic delivery of 0, 1, or 11 pellets. The within groups manipulation was
the probability of the 0-pellet or 1-pellet outcomes (see Table 3). For half of the rats in each
group, the first set of phases involved manipulation of the 0-pellet outcome. In Phase 1, the
probability of 0 pellets, p[0], was .1, so that the probability of receiving 1 or 11 pellets was
.9(p[1] = .45 and p[11] = .45). In Phases 2–4, p[0] was .9, .5, and .1, respectively, and p[1] and
p[11] were each equal to .05, .25, and .45, respectively. For the other half of the rats in each
group, the first set of phases involved manipulations of the 1-pellet outcome, so that in Phases
1–4, p[1] was equal to .1, .9, .5, and .1, respectively, and p[0] and p[11] were each equal to .45,
.05, .25, and .45, respectively. In the second set of phases, those rats first experiencing the p[0]
manipulation then experienced the p[1] manipulation and vice versa. In both sets of phases,
Table 3. Expected value of the high-uncertainty choice as a function of the probability of receiving 0
pellets (P[0]) or 1 pellet (P[1]) following a high-uncertainty choice in the high-uncertainty probability
training procedure of Experiment 3A.
Probability P[0] p[1]
.10 5.40 5.05
.50 3.00 3.25
.90 0.60 1.45
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.t003
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the outcome that followed the four high-uncertainty forced choice trials was either the 11-pel-
let outcome or the other high-uncertainty outcome with the same probability of delivery (i.e., 0
pellets in the p[1] condition, 1 pellet in the P[0] condition). Phase 1 lasted for 20 sessions. Phase 2
lasted for 10 sessions. Phases 3–5 each lasted for 11 sessions. Phases 6–7 each lasted for 10 sessions.
Experiment 3B: Low-uncertainty magnitude training. The training procedure was identi-
cal to high-uncertainty probability training with a few exceptions. Low-uncertainty choices re-
sulted in the delivery of only one outcome magnitude, which was 3, 1, 5, and 3 pellets or 3, 5, 1,
and 3 pellets in Phases 1–4, respectively. The high-uncertainty choice outcomes were 0, 1, and
11 pellets, and the probability of receiving 1 or 11 pellets following a high-uncertainty choice
was .25 across phases (i.e., p[food] = .50) with p[0] equal to .5. Phase 1 lasted for 11 sessions.
Phases 2–4 lasted for 10 sessions.
Data analysis. Data analysis was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. For analysis of high-un-
certainty probability training, the final five sessions of Phases 2–7 were used for data analyses.
Due to an equipment error that resulted in data loss, sessions 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11 of Phase 3 were
used for analysis of one rat, and sessions 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 of Phase 5 were used for analysis of
four rats. The rats’molar choice behavior was stable across the final five sessions of each phase.
Across Phases 2–7, the mean absolute deviation in choice percentages between each of the final
five sessions and the mean of the final five sessions of each phase was 3.5%. Three rats were re-
moved from the molecular analyses of the high-uncertainty probability training phase due to
missing data. Specifically, of the 240 data points involved in this analysis (24 subjects × 5 previous
outcomes × 2 probability conditions), there were 3 missing data points, one per each of the rats
removed from this analysis. Two rats did not receive any H-S outcomes and one rat did not re-
ceive any H-L outcomes in the P[0] condition, such that there were not any data as a function of
these previous outcomes. The missing data occurred because of general risk aversion and relative-
ly small number of high-uncertainty choices in those individuals. For low-uncertainty magnitude
training, the final five sessions of Phases 2–4 were used for data analyses. The rats’molar choice
behavior was stable across the final five sessions of each phase. Across Phases 2–4, the mean ab-
solute deviation in choice percentages between each of the final five sessions and the mean of the
final five sessions of each phase was 5.5%. Seven rats were removed from the molecular analyses
of the low-uncertainty magnitude training phases due to missing data, leaving a total of 17 rats in
this analysis. Of the 288 data points involved in this analysis (24 subjects × 4 previous outcomes ×
3 low-uncertainty magnitudes), there were 12 missing data points. Half of these missing data
points were due to the absence of data following a high-uncertainty magnitude when the low-
uncertainty magnitude was equal to 5 pellets (i.e., when the rats were less likely to make high-
uncertainty choices). With the exception of one rat that was missing four data points due to
general risk aversion, the maximum number of missing data points per rat was two.
Results
Experiment 3A: High-uncertainty probability training.Molar analysis: Fig. 7 shows the log
odds of high-uncertainty choices as a function of the probability of receiving 0 pellets (P[0]) or
1 pellet (p[1]) for a high-uncertainty choice for the two groups of rats (Cronbach’s α = .85).
There was a general decrease in high-uncertainty choices as the probability of receiving the 0-
or 1-pellet outcome increased, indicating that the rats were sensitive to the increased likelihood
of both outcomes. Overall, the functions were generally similar for the four conditions, but the
choice functions were slightly steeper for the P[0] conditions than the p[1] conditions. An
ANOVA was conducted with group (2–4 and 1–5) as the between groups factor, and probabili-
ty (.1, .5, and .9) and condition (P[0] and p[1]) as within groups factors. The analysis revealed a
main effect of probability, F(2, 44) = 14.02, p< .001, ηp
2 = .389, and a Condition × Probability
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Fig 7. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices for each group in the high-uncertainty
probability training procedure of Experiment 3A as a function of the probability of the 0-pellet
outcome (P[0]) or the 1-pellet outcome (P[1]).Note that high-uncertainty choices are plotted against the
probability of the manipulated outcome rather than as a function of overall probability of food, as was the case
in previous figures. A second ordinate showing percentages corresponding to the log odds values was
included to aid interpretation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g007
Fig 8. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices collapsed across groups in the high-
uncertainty probability training procedure of Experiment 3A as a function of the outcome of the
previous choice, collapsed across probability. A second ordinate showing percentages corresponding to
the log odds values was included to aid interpretation. L-S = low-uncertainty-small; L-L = low-uncertainty-
large; H-Z = high-uncertainty-zero; H-S = high-uncertainty-small; H-L = high-uncertainty-large; P[0] = probability
of 0 pellets; p[1] = probability of 1 pellet.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g008
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interaction, F(2, 44) = 5.95, p = .005, ηp
2 = .213. Simple effects analyses (i.e., paired samples
t-tests) revealed significantly lower high-uncertainty choices in the P[0] condition compared to
the p[1] condition at the probability of. 9, but no significant differences at other probabilities.
Molecular analysis: Fig. 8 shows the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following each of the
previous outcomes, collapsed across probability (Cronbach’s α = .84). The data were also col-
lapsed across group to ease interpretation of the data and as there was no effect of group in the
molar analyses. As seen in Fig. 8, the rats were generally more likely to make low-uncertainty
choices after low-uncertainty outcomes (L-S, L-L) and high-uncertainty choices after high-un-
certainty outcomes (H-Z, H-S, H-L). Interestingly, high-uncertainty choice behavior following
H-Z and H-S outcomes depended on the probability condition (P[0] vs. p[1]). In the P[0] con-
dition, when the probability of the H-Z outcome was manipulated such that the probabilities
for the H-S and H-L outcomes were identical, rats were less likely to make high-uncertainty
choices following H-Z outcomes than following H-S outcomes. However, in the p[1] condition,
when the probability of the H-S outcome was manipulated such that the probabilities for the
H-Z and H-L outcomes were identical, the rats displayed fewer high-uncertainty choices fol-
lowing H-S outcomes than following H-Z outcomes. There were no apparent differences fol-
lowing H-L outcomes. An ANOVA with previous outcome and condition as within groups
factors and group as the between groups factor revealed a main effect of previous outcome,
F(4, 76) = 114.92, p< .001, ηp
2 = .858, and a Condition × Previous Outcome interaction,
F(4, 76) = 10.06, p< .001, ηp
2 = .346. Paired samples t-tests conducted on the interaction
disclosed significantly fewer high-uncertainty choices following H-Z outcomes in the P[0] con-
dition than in the p[1] condition, and significantly fewer high-uncertainty choices following
H-S outcomes in the p[1] condition than in the P[0] condition.
Within a win-stay/lose-shift framework, the present results suggest that when the probabili-
ty of receiving 1 pellet was manipulated, the reception of 1 pellet was regarded as a greater loss
than the reception of 0 pellets; the reverse was true in the P[0] condition. While this pattern
seems counterintuitive given that 0 is objectively and numerically smaller than 1, these results
may reflect different underlying mechanisms. Recall that in the p[1] condition, the initial high-
uncertainty forced choice trials terminated in either 0 or 11 pellets. This procedure is compara-
ble to gambling and probabilistic choice paradigms in which high-uncertainty choices result in
either a large gain or no reward [64]. Given such an analogous structure, an additional analysis
was conducted to determine if the decrease in post-outcome behavior was related to an individ-
ual rat’s propensity to make high-uncertainty choices. A partial correlational analysis was con-
ducted between the rats’mean log odds of high-uncertainty choices (collapsed across
probability) in the P[0] and p[1] conditions (collapsing across groups) and the reduction in the
log odds of high-uncertainty choices following H-S outcomes compared to H-Z outcomes
(H-S – H-Z for P[0] and H-Z – H-S for p[1]), controlling for overall post H-Z or H-S choice
behavior. Two animals were excluded from the analysis of the P[0] condition due to missing
data. Specifically, as described above, two animals did not receive the H-S outcome in the P[0]
condition, such that there were no choice data as a function of this previous outcome. The
missing data occurred because of general risk aversion and relatively small number of high-un-
certainty choices in those individuals. Specifically, in Fig. 9A, the difference score refers to post
H-S high-uncertainty choice behavior minus post H-Z high-uncertainty choice behavior, such
that a larger difference reflects more high-uncertainty choice behavior following H-S outcomes.
In Fig. 9C, the difference score is reversed; that is, the difference score refers to post H-Z high-
uncertainty choice behavior minus post H-S high-uncertainty choice behavior, so that a larger
difference here reflects more high-uncertainty choice behavior following H-Z outcomes. These
difference score values are reversed due to the opposing directions of these data in Fig. 8. The
analysis of the P[0] conditions revealed a significant zero-order correlation between mean log
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odds of high-uncertainty choices and the change in high-uncertainty choice behavior following
H-Z outcomes relative to H-S outcomes, r = .64, p = .001 (Fig. 9A), but the partial correlation
was not significant when controlling for mean post H-Z choice behavior, r = .26, p = .265
(Fig. 9B). For the p[1] conditions, there was a significant positive zero-order correlation,
r = .51, p = .010, and a significant positive partial correlation, r = .50, p = .015, controlling for
mean post H-S choice behavior (Fig. 9C and 9D).
Experiment 3B: Low-certainty magnitude training.Molar analysis: Fig. 10 shows the log
odds of high-uncertainty choices as a function of the low-uncertainty outcome magnitude
(Cronbach’s α = .84). The rats made significantly fewer high-uncertainty choices with increases
in the low-uncertainty reward magnitude, F(2, 46) = 32.01, p< .001, ηp
2 = .582.Molecular
analysis: Fig. 11 shows the log odds of high-uncertainty choices as a function of the previous
outcome and the low-uncertainty outcome magnitude (Cronbach’s α = .91). The rats made
more low-uncertainty choices following low-uncertainty outcomes and more high-uncertainty
choices following high-uncertainty outcomes. An ANOVA with low-uncertainty outcome
magnitude and previous outcome as within groups factors revealed a main effect of low-uncer-
tainty outcome magnitude, F(2, 32) = 38.30, p< .001, ηp
2 = .705, a main effect of previous out-
come, F(3, 48) = 86.00, p< .001, ηp
2 = .843, and a Low-Uncertainty Outcome Magnitude ×
Previous Outcome interaction, F(6, 96) = 2.70, p = .018, ηp
2 = .144. Paired-sample t-tests were
conducted on post H-Z and post H-S choice behavior to explore the interaction. When the
Fig 9. A: Zero-order correlation between the mean log odds of high-uncertainty choices across probabilities of the P[0] condition (abscissa) and
the difference score in the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following high-uncertainty-zero (H-Z) outcomes relative to high-uncertainty-small
(H-S) outcomes (ordinate).Here, post H-Z high-uncertainty choice behavior was subtracted from post H-S high-uncertainty choice behavior. B: Partial
correlation between the two variables in Panel A, controlling for mean post H-Z choice behavior. The abscissa and ordinate show the residuals derived from
the correlations of these variables with mean post H-Z choice behavior. C: Zero-order correlation between the mean log odds of high-uncertainty choices
across probabilities of the p[1] condition (abscissa) and the difference score in the log odds of high-uncertainty choices following H-S outcomes relative to
H-Z outcomes (ordinate). Here, post H-S high-uncertainty choice behavior was subtracted from post H-Z high-uncertainty choice behavior. D: Partial
correlation between these two variables, controlling for mean post H-S choice behavior. The abscissa and ordinate show the residuals derived from the
correlations of these variables with mean post H-S choice behavior. The best fitting regression line and variance accounted for (R2) is shown in each panel.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g009
Fig 10. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices in the low-uncertainty magnitude training
procedure of Experiment 3B as a function of the outcomemagnitude of a low-uncertainty choice. A
second ordinate showing percentages corresponding to the log odds values is included to aid interpretation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g010
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low-uncertainty outcome was 1 pellet, the rats were significantly more likely to make high-
uncertainty choices following the H-S outcome than following the H-Z outcome, t(16) = 2.28,
p = .037. However, when the low-uncertainty outcome was 3 or 5 pellets, the rats did not differ
in their choices following H-S and H-Z outcomes.
Discussion
The goal of the current experiment was to further investigate the hypothesis that the expected
value of the low-uncertainty choice served as the reference point for distinguishing high-uncer-
tainty gains from losses. During high-uncertainty probability training, the rats showed an in-
crease in high-uncertainty choice behavior as a function of the probability of the H-L outcome,
similar to results shown in Experiments 1 and 2. Interestingly, this effect of H-L outcome prob-
ability was moderated by condition (Fig. 7); the P[0] condition produced steeper choice func-
tions than the p[1] condition. Therefore, these results generally corroborate the results of
Experiments 1 and 2, in that the rats were more sensitive to zero than non-zero losses. Howev-
er, the rats were sensitive to the p[1] changes, indicating that they treated the 1-pellet outcome
as a loss. Furthermore, the absence of group effects on molar choice behavior suggests that the
expected value of the low-uncertainty choice governed choice behavior to a greater degree than
the individual magnitudes. Thus, the general risk aversion observed in Fig. 7 was likely induced
by the probabilistic delivery of two losses (H-Z, H-S) versus one gain (H-L). Indeed, the rats
were risk averse when the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice approximated that of
the low-uncertainty choice (at a probability of .5), suggesting that: (1) the likelihood of a loss
outweighed the possibility of an 11-pellet gain, and (2) the expected value of the high-uncer-
tainty choice influenced choice behavior to a lesser degree than did the possibility of receiving
a high-uncertainty loss.
The results from the molar analyses were complemented by comparable results at the mo-
lecular level. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, the rats made more low-uncertainty choices
Fig 11. Mean (±SEM) log odds of high-uncertainty choices in the low-uncertainty magnitude training
procedure of Experiment 3B as a function of the outcome of the previous choice and the outcome
magnitude (pellets, p) of a low-uncertainty outcome choice. A second ordinate showing percentages
corresponding to the log odds values is included to aid interpretation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g011
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following low-uncertainty outcomes and more high-uncertainty choices following high-uncer-
tainty outcomes [33]. The absence of a group effect on local choice behavior supported the im-
portance of the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice, in contrast to its individual
values, in governing probabilistic choice (Fig. 8). The most striking result of the current experi-
ment was the effect of probability condition on choice behavior following H-S and H-Z out-
comes (Fig. 8). In the P[1] condition, the rats were more likely to make a high-uncertainty
choice following H-Z outcomes than following H-S outcomes; given that independent trial out-
comes were orthogonal, these data cannot be explained by the delivery of H-Z outcomes pre-
dicting an increased likelihood of receiving food for a subsequent high-uncertainty choice. In
addition, this behavioral pattern was related to the rats’ overall risk proneness in the p[1] con-
dition, but not in the P[0] condition (Fig. 9). Specifically, in the p[1] condition, the rats that
showed the greatest reduction in high-uncertainty choice behavior following H-S than follow-
ing H-Z outcomes (controlling for overall H-S choices) were those that were more likely to
make high-uncertainty choices at a molar level. While it may be argued that rats that do not
make many high-uncertainty choices would be less affected by different high-uncertainty out-
comes, the present results maintain their translational significance in showing the involvement
of differential loss processing in overall risky choice behavior. Specifically, the partial correla-
tional analyses (Fig. 9B, 9D) controlled for baseline levels of post-outcome choice behavior,
therefore suggesting that the molecular processing of differential losses itself correlates with
molar choice behavior. Thus, these results ultimately suggest that non-zero losses could poten-
tially be employed in behavioral interventions to reduce baseline tendencies to make risky
choices. Intuitively, this technique may convey the futility of gambling if the winning outcome
is less than what could have been earned for making an alternative choice. In addition, it may
be more difficult to ignore a non-zero outcome than a zero-outcome, because zero outcomes
can be construed as the absence of an event occurrence.
Ultimately, as the delivery of a 1-pellet outcome resulted in a subsequent reduction rather
than increase in high-uncertainty choice behavior, the present results lend direct support to the
idea that uncertain outcomes in the present experiment were distinguished as gains and losses
relative to the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice. The results of the low-uncertainty
magnitude training phases corroborated this explanation, as global choice behavior was sub-
stantially affected by the objective value of the low-uncertainty outcome (Fig. 10). Specifically,
even though there was the same absolute relationship between the H-Z and H-S outcomes
across phases, there was a difference in local high-uncertainty choice behavior depending
on the low-uncertainty outcome magnitude; this supports the present hypotheses of a low-
uncertainty reference point. If high-uncertainty gains and losses (and corresponding win-
stay/lose-shift behavior) were distinguished purely with respect to the expected value of the
high-uncertainty choice, then high-uncertainty choice behavior following each of the high-
uncertainty outcomes should have been relatively constant as a function of low-uncertainty
outcome magnitude (Fig. 11), which was not the case here. While such results may appear in-
consistent with the above explanations of greater sensitivity to greater losses, it is important to
remember that a diminishing sensitivity with increased separation from the reference point is a
core tenet of theoretical accounts of decision-making [16], an issue that is considered in more
detail in the General Discussion. If both the H-S and H-Z outcomes were losses, then increased
separation from the 5-pellet low-uncertainty reward may be assumed to produce a more simi-
lar treatment of the loss outcomes. Therefore, the changes in post H-Z and post H-S behavior
as a function of the low-uncertainty outcome magnitude suggests that the 1-pellet H-S out-
come was regarded as a loss because of its relationship to the low-uncertainty choice expected
value rather than its proximity to 0. Accordingly, the present results corroborate those of the
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experiments above, suggesting that rats’ evaluative mechanisms involve comparison to out-
comes that could have been obtained had a different choice been made.
The current results, especially the effect of the 1-pellet outcome, serve as an intriguing com-
plement to more recent research that has identified “losses-disguised-as-wins” as a potentially
relevant factor driving the onset of maladaptive gambling behavior. Dixon et al. [65] described
a considerable proportion of gambling outcomes as positive monetary values that are objective-
ly less than the amount wagered, making these outcomes losses, even though they are presented
as wins. In other words, individuals experience losses that are presented as if they won. Dixon
et al. [65] measured changes in heart rate and skin conductance responses following wins,
losses, and losses-disguised-as-wins. Interestingly, while heart rate changed in seemingly simi-
lar ways following losses and losses-disguised-as-wins, skin conductance responses were more
similar following wins and losses-disguised-as-wins. Thus, such results suggest that the presen-
tation of outcomes, which may be subjectively regarded as wins or losses, elicit a complex bio-
logical response that may consequently distinguish those individuals susceptible to
problematic risky decision making behaviors.
These results are especially relevant to the present experiments, as the 1-pellet outcomes in
Experiments 1, 3A, and 3B may be viewed as losses-disguised-as-wins; they were less than the
expected value of the low-uncertainty choice (loss) but were also positive food amounts deliv-
ered in the same way as the larger 11-pellet outcomes (win). Given the individual differences in
processing the 0- and 1-pellet losses (Fig. 9), it is possible that losses-disguised-as-wins may be
perceived as wins in some individuals and losses in others. As Dixon et al. [65] suggested that
losses-disguised-as-wins may lead to elevated gambling behavior, individual differences in the
processing of small losses may ultimately predict overall risk-taking behavior (Fig. 9). Further-
more, Dixon et al. [65] noted that wins and losses-disguised-as-wins are delivered with approx-
imately equal percentages in some slot machine games. In the present experiment, when the
11- and 1-pellet outcomes were delivered with similar probabilities (P[0] condition), rats were
more likely to make risky choices following 1-pellet outcomes than following zero-pellet out-
comes, a comparable result to the losses-disguised-as-wins phenomenon. However, this was
not the case when the 1-pellet outcomes were delivered with different probabilities compared
to the 11-pellet outcome (p[1] condition). Thus, if the losses-disguised-as-wins phenomenon
can be explained by the frequencies of differential losses, then the present results serve as a crit-
ical advancement in our understanding of the mechanisms that govern risk-taking behavior.
Therefore, individual differences in decision making following different outcomes, especially
losses, may in fact serve as the ultimate predictor for the likelihood of onset of problem-gam-
bling and other maladaptive behaviors.
General Discussion
The primary goal of the present experiments was to differentiate between three possible refer-
ence points that may affect judgments of high-uncertainty gains versus losses in rats: high-un-
certainty, zero-outcome, and low-uncertainty. The collective results suggest that the rats used
the expected value of the low-uncertainty outcome as a reference point for gauging high-uncer-
tainty gains and losses (see Table 4 for an integrated summary of the results). Specifically, the
rats showed significant differences in choice behavior following high-uncertainty outcomes
greater than and less than the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice (Figs. 2, 5, 8 and
11). In addition, they were insensitive to the individual values that comprised the low-uncer-
tainty outcome (Fig. 7), but showed strong sensitivity to the low-uncertainty outcome when
that value was manipulated in Experiment 3 (Fig. 10). The combined results indicate that the
rats were likely using the low-uncertainty expected value. However, there were no systematic
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differences in choice behavior following the H-S outcome depending on whether it was greater
than or less than the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice (Figs. 3 and 6). This latter
result suggests that the H-S outcome was not differentiated as a gain or a loss relative to a high-
uncertainty reference point, as would have been suggested had there been significant differ-
ences in post H-S choice behavior depending on its gain/loss dichotomization relative to the
expected value of the high-uncertainty choice.
In conjunction with the results suggesting a low-uncertainty reference point, a second rela-
tively novel finding of the present experiments was that rats were more sensitive to differential
losses than they were to differential gains, as has been described previously in humans [16]. In-
terestingly, while a recent report by Bhatti et al. [26] did postulate a possible effect of loss mag-
nitude on loss aversion in rats, the present report included experimental manipulations that
directly investigated loss versus gain sensitivity in rats. Therefore, while previous research has
described the non-linear relationship between objective and subjective stimulus magnitudes in
animals (i.e., Weber’s law) [66], this is the first comprehensive evidence, to our knowledge, de-
scribing differential sensitivity to gains and losses in rats within a probabilistic choice task. Fur-
thermore, as common computational mechanisms of valuation have been assumed to follow a
linear value-updating mechanism, suggesting that individuals are equally sensitive to gains and
losses [67], previous computational modeling of non-human primate choice behavior has con-
sidered separate parameters for value updating in the gain and loss domain [68,69]. The pres-
ent results support the use of the latter modeling approach. Therefore, as the present
experiment employed multiple parametric manipulations of magnitude, in conjunction with
thorough analyses of probabilistic choice behavior, the current results suggest that, like hu-
mans, rats may be differentially sensitive to probabilistic gains and losses. Altogether, these re-
sults strengthen the premise that rats serve as a viable animal model of risky decision making
behaviors [15]. Indeed, in relation to this supposition, the rats showed consistent and stable
Table 4. Summary of the primary results from Experiments 1–3.
Molar Results Molecular Results: Post High-
Uncertainty-Outcome Behavior
Conclusions
Expt. 1 -Group 1–11 < 2–11 < 4–11 -Group 1–11: H-Z < H-S < H-L -Low-uncertainty reference point
-Group 2–11: H-Z < H-S < H-L -Greater sensitivity to differential
losses-Group 4–11: H-Z < H-S  H-L
Expt. 2 -Group 4–6  4–9  4–11 -Group 4–6: H-Z < H-S  H-L -Low-uncertainty or zero-outcome
reference point
-Group 4–9: H-Z < H-S  H-L -Reduced sensitivity to differential
gains-Group 4–11: H-Z < H-S  H-L
Expt. 3: High-
uncertainty
Probability
-Group 1–5  2–4 -Group 1–5  Group 2–4 -Low-uncertainty reference point
-P[0] condition produced steeper choice
functions than p[1] condition
-P[0] condition: H-Z < H-S -Greater sensitivity to 0-pellet
outcome
-p[1] condition: H-Z > H-S -Sensitivity to 1-pellet loss
predicted overall high-uncertainty
choices
Expt. 3: Low-
uncertainty
Magnitude
-Reduction in high-uncertainty choice with
increases in low-uncertainty-outcome
magnitude
-Reduction in high-uncertainty choice with
increases in low-uncertainty outcome
magnitude
-Low-uncertainty reference point
-Differential effect of low-uncertainty
magnitude on post H-Z and post H-S choice
*Note: H-Z = high-uncertainty-zero; H-S = high-uncertainty-small; H-L = high-uncertainty-large.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.t004
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behavior when tested with different choice parameters, with alpha values in the moderate to
high range in all cases. This further verifies the validity of the rat as a model by demonstrating
that probabilistic choice is a stable trait in rats.
Theories of Probabilistic Choice Behavior
Several theoretical frameworks have incorporated reference points in evaluating choice out-
comes as gains and losses. While these frameworks have been frequently shown to account for
molar choice behavior, a more critical assessment would include their ability to account for
choice behavior on a molecular scale [70,71]. Two of the most influential theories of choice be-
havior are prospect theory [16,18] and optimal foraging theory [43]. In prospect theory, an in-
dividual’s subjective reference point reflects what an individual currently has or rather what an
individual expects/aspires to have [16]. Prospect theory [16, p. 287] predicts greater risk-seek-
ing following losses that have not yet been adapted to [18,42,72,73]. In optimal foraging theory,
choice behavior is driven by the goal to maximize energy intake at the expense of the energy
needed during the act of foraging [43,59,74,75]. If a previous outcome attenuates the ability to
reach this energy intake threshold, then the animal may exhibit subsequent risk seeking behav-
ior to compensate for the prior loss [76]. Therefore, optimal foraging theory can also predict
risk seeking following losses. In contrast, the results of the current experiments suggest that the
rats were more risk seeking following gains (H-L) than following losses (H-Z; Figs. 2, 5, 8, and
11). Therefore, neither prospect theory nor optimal foraging theory seems able to account for
the effects of previous outcomes on subsequent choice behavior in the present tasks.
Other theoretical frameworks predict greater risk seeking following gains than following
losses, such as the reinforcement learning model [20] and the quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis
[77–79]. The reinforcement learning model assumes that an individual maintains an expecta-
tion of choice value; any deviation from this expectation causes a prediction error that is used
to update reward expectancy [67,68]. As higher valued outcomes are more likely to be chosen
over lower valued ones, recent outcomes that increase or decrease the subjective value of a
choice would thereby increase or decrease, respectively, the propensity to make that choice
again. Thus, win-stay/lose-shift behavior is a direct prediction of reinforcement learning, con-
sistent with the present results (Figs. 2, 5, 8, and 11). While such a prediction may depend on
the assumptions of the reinforcement learning algorithm [80], the present results are consid-
ered in terms of simple model-free reinforcement learning (i.e., updating choice expectations
directly based on experience with such choices), which does contribute to win-stay / lose-shift
behavior in humans [80]. Accordingly, this reinforcement learning model also proposes that
high-uncertainty gains and losses are gauged relative to a high-uncertainty reference point, but
this is not consistent with the present findings.
In the quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis, the differences in choice behavior following prior
losses and prior gains are due to the differential integration of prior outcomes with prospective
outcomes. Following gains, individuals are predicted to be risk seeking because subsequent
losses are perceived as decreases in current gains; alternatively, individuals are risk averse fol-
lowing losses due to aversion to additional losses [77]. Accordingly, win-stay/lose-shift behav-
ior is predicted by the quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis. However, a corollary of this
framework is that individuals will exhibit risk seeking behavior following losses if subsequent
gambles permit the ability to “break even” [81,82]. As the rats in all groups of the present ex-
periments seemingly had the opportunity to break even (given prior losses) by making a subse-
quent high-uncertainty choice (i.e., receiving the 11-pellet H-L outcome), a break-even effect
would have been evident if the rats made more high-uncertainty choices following losses (e.g.,
H-Z outcomes) than following gains (e.g., H-L outcomes), which was not shown here (Figs. 2,
Relative Gains and Losses in Rats
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697 February 6, 2015 26 / 33
5, 8, and 11). Therefore, the proposed effects of previous outcomes on subsequent choice be-
havior by both the reinforcement learning and quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis frameworks
can only partially account for the molecular results in the present experiments.
A more recent theoretical framework that is potentially relevant to the present studies is tri-
reference point theory [19]. Rather than assuming that an individual uses one reference point
to distinguish gains from losses, the tri-reference point theory assumes that individuals use
three reference points that partition outcomes into failures, losses, gains, and successes. The
reference points that separate failures from losses, losses from gains, and gains from successes
are referred to as the minimum requirement, the status quo, and the goal reference points, re-
spectively. Wang and Johnson [19] proposed that outcomes on opposite sides of a given refer-
ence point should have greater effects on behavior relative to outcomes between two reference
points. The expected value of the low-uncertainty choice in the present experiment meets this
criterion in regard to high-uncertainty gains and losses. Interestingly, the significant differences
in choice behavior following H-Z and H-S outcomes in Groups 1–11 and 2–11 in Experiment
1 do not adhere to this criterion; the results may then suggest the presence of a second refer-
ence point comparable to a zero-based reference point, so that H-Z outcomes are regarded as
greater losses than H-S outcomes. Accordingly, future research is warranted to investigate such
a phenomenon. Ultimately, even though this framework does not seem to make any explicit
predictions concerning the effects of failures, losses, gains, and successes on subsequent choice
behavior, the tri-reference point theory may serve as a comprehensive approach to understand-
ing reference points for different outcomes.
An Integration of Theoretical Frameworks
The theories of choice behavior described above posit distinct mechanisms to account for prob-
abilistic decision making. While each theory may not be able to fully account for the present
data, there are individual elements that are applicable. For example, prospect theory suggests
that the subjective value of a gain is a positively increasing, negatively accelerating function of
the objective magnitude of the gain [16]. Accordingly, the subjective value of greater outcome
magnitudes is increasingly diminished so that the difference between 2 and 4 pellets would be
subjectively greater than the difference between 8 and 10 pellets. While this negative accelera-
tion has been used to explain overall risk aversion in the domain of gains [16], this component
of prospect theory may be able to explain the effects of the previous outcome on subsequent
choice behavior. This is also consistent with bothWeber’s law, which predicts that the same ab-
solute difference in outcome magnitude would elicit smaller effects on choice behavior with in-
creases in absolute outcome magnitude (also see [66] for an application of Weber’s law to risky
choice in pigeons), as well as certain economic principles, such as diminishing marginal utility
and the law of diminishing returns [16,83,84].
Fig. 12 shows a diminishing marginal utility (in this case a logistic) function for the relative
value of the high-uncertainty magnitudes ranging from 0 to 11 pellets, with XRP demarcating
the low-uncertainty reference point of 3 pellets in this example. Note that high-uncertainty
outcomes greater than XRP are gains and outcomes less than XRP are losses, and the relative
value function reflects the experienced degree of relative gain or loss. The difference between
the subjective values of previous high-uncertainty losses (i.e., x< XRP) is greater than the dif-
ferences between the subjective values of previous high-uncertainty gains, and as a result differ-
ential losses are predicted to elicit greater differences in subsequent choice behavior than
differential gains (see Figs. 2 and 5). This mechanism accounts for the three novel findings in
the present experiment: (1) a low-uncertainty reference point to distinguish probabilistic gains
and losses (XRP), (2) an augmented sensitivity to losses over gains due to the steeper function
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associated with smaller high-uncertainty magnitudes (losses), and (3) an effect of non-zero
losses distinguishable from effects of both zero-magnitude losses and non-zero gains. This
model also predicts the strong effect of the low-uncertainty outcome magnitude on choice be-
havior that was observed in Experiment 3B (Fig. 10) as this would be equivalent to changing
the value of XRP.
In conjunction with the present results, previous evidence supports the descriptive model
diagrammed in Fig. 12. For example, this mechanism is consistent with the strong effects of re-
ward omission found within choice and non-choice paradigms [33,61,62], as the greatest dif-
ferences in subjective value relative to a low-uncertainty reference point would be produced by
H-Z outcomes. Therefore, high-uncertainty gains and losses relative to the expected value of
the low-uncertainty choice would ultimately result in an increased and decreased tendency, re-
spectively, to make a subsequent high-uncertainty choice. Importantly, if win-stay/lose-shift
behavior was collapsed across trials, then a higher frequency of gains should produce more
high-uncertainty choices and a higher frequency of losses should produce more low-uncertain-
ty choices. Consequently, local choice behavior could ultimately predict the global pattern of
an increase in high-uncertainty choice as a function of the probability of high-uncertainty food
delivery (e.g., Fig. 1) [85].
As described above, diminishing marginal utility is a critical component of the model in the
gain and loss domain, as increased separation of the outcomes from the reference point should
attenuate the impact of the individual outcomes. While the case could be made that the present
results could be purely explained in terms of marginal utility, there does seem to be reason to
believe that a reference point account is mutually exclusive from a marginal utility account.
Specifically, the criterion from which utility diminishes may be regarded as an individual’s ref-
erence point. Indeed, in non-human primates, Stauffer et al. [86] demonstrated diminishing
dopaminergic responses to equivalent prediction errors farther from the overall expected value
of a fixation stimulus. As these corresponding data were not collected in a choice procedure,
the primary reference point in that experiment should have been the expected value of the fixa-
tion stimulus. The present results complement these data by demonstrating that the primary
Fig 12. A proposedmechanism to account for the asymmetric effects of previous high-uncertainty
choice outcomes on subsequent choice behavior. The abscissa is the magnitude of the previous high-
uncertainty outcome. The ordinate is the subjective value of the previous high-uncertainty outcome relative to
the value of the low-uncertainty outcome choice (e.g., 3 food pellets). The low-uncertainty outcome reference
(XRP) differentiates gains and losses for the high-uncertainty outcomes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117697.g012
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reference point from which utility and value of high-uncertainty gains and losses diminishes is
the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice. Specifically, as the abscissa in Figs. 3 and 6
could be relabeled “H-S prediction error”, a high-uncertainty reference point explanation, in
conjunction with Stauffer et al. [86], would have predicted that an increase along the abscissa
produces more similar treatment of the H-L and H-S outcomes (i.e., the H-L and H-S out-
comes are farther from the high-uncertainty reference point). However, the constancy of the
function suggests that despite changes in the expected value of the high-uncertainty choice, the
reference point was in fact constant across conditions. Therefore, in accordance with the expla-
nations above, our data support a low-uncertainty reference point.
Conclusions
Probabilistic gains and losses drive the decisions among multiple choice outcomes that differ in
the magnitudes and probabilities of their outcomes. Behavioral, neurobiological, and neuro-
economic accounts of such effects have shaped our understanding of probabilistic decision
making [16,67,87–91]. In conjunction with these contributions to our understanding of proba-
bilistic decision making, the present experiments have provided crucial insight into the mecha-
nisms of choice behavior that determine judgments of high-uncertainty gains and losses in
rats. To our knowledge, the present set of studies may compose one of the most comprehensive
behavioral accounts of trial-by-trial probabilistic choice behavior in terms of reference point
use in rats, an important preclinical model for human choice behavior [15]. Accordingly, while
differential sensitivities to gains and losses have been described in humans [16,18,63], there has
been relatively minimal discussion of reference-point use in animals, especially regarding the
general notion that high-uncertainty gains and losses are gauged relative to the expected value
of the low-uncertainty choice (but see [46,92,93] for a related mechanism). The present results
also have implications for the mechanisms underlying factors that influence gambling behav-
ior, such as those involved in processing losses-disguised-as-wins [65]. Given previous reports
identifying individual differences in choice behavior [52,94,95], future research should address
individual differences in reference point use and how that may predict risk-taking behavior. In
consideration of the present support for a low-uncertainty reference point, the possibility must
be entertained that the current models and frameworks of probabilistic choice require modifi-
cation. Overall, the present experiments represent a considerable advancement in forming a
deeper understanding of the mechanisms of probabilistic choice behavior in animal models.
Only when such a comprehensive understanding is achieved can we then begin to fully eluci-
date the underlying psychological and neurobiological processes that drive individual differ-
ences in the risky decision making behaviors that can plague society.
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